Government Failure

In the analysis of regulation, government failure (or non-market failure) is imperfection in government performance.[1] The phrase "government failure" emerged as a term of art in the early 1960s with the rise of intellectual and political criticism of government regulations. Building on the premise that the only legitimate rationale for government regulation was market failure, economists advanced new theories explaining why government interventions in markets were costly and tend to fail.[2] For example, it was argued that government failure occurs when government intervention causes a more inefficient allocation of goods and resources than would occur without that intervention. In not comparing realized inadequacies of market outcomes against those of potential interventions, one writer describes the "anatomy" of market failure[3] as providing "only limited help in prescribing therapies for government success".[4] Government failures, however, also occur whenever the government performs inadequately, including when it fails to intervene or does not intervene sufficiently.[5] Some use the phrase "passive government failure" to describe the government's failure to intervene in a market failure that would result in a socially preferable mix of output.[6] Just as with market failures, there are different kinds of government failures that describe corresponding economic distortions.


An early use of "government failure" was by Ronald Coase (1964) in comparing an actual and ideal system of industrial regulation:[7]

Contemplation of an optimal system may provide techniques of analysis that would otherwise have been missed and, in certain special cases, it may go far to providing a solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has directed economists' attention away from the main question, which is how alternative arrangements will actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive conclusions for economic policy from a study of an abstract of a market situation. It is no accident that in the literature...we find a category "market failure" but no category "government failure." Until we realize that we are choosing between social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway.

Roland McKean used the term in 1965 to suggest limitations on an invisible-hand notion of government behavior.[8] More formal and general analysis followed[9] in such areas as development economics,[10]ecological economics,[11]political science,[12]political economy,[13]public choice theory,[14] and transaction-cost economics.[15]

The idea of government failure is associated with the policy argument that, even if particular markets may not meet the standard conditions of perfect competition required to ensure social optimality, government intervention may make matters worse rather than better.

Just as a market failure is not a failure to bring a particular or favored solution into existence at desired prices but is rather a problem which prevents the market from operating efficiently, a government failure is not a failure of the government to bring about a particular solution but is rather a systemic problem which prevents an efficient government solution to a problem. The problem to be solved need not be a market failure; sometimes, some voters may prefer a governmental solution even when a market solution is possible.

Government failure can be on both the demand side and the supply side. Demand-side failures include preference-revelation problems and the illogics of voting and collective behaviour. Supply-side failures largely result from principal-agent problem.[16]


Economic crowding out

Crowding out is the displacement of private sector investment by way of higher interest rates, when the government expands its borrowing to finance increased expenditure or tax cuts in excess of revenue. Government spending is also said to crowd out private spending by individuals.[17]


Regulatory arbitrage is a regulated institution's taking advantage of the difference between its real (or economic) risk and the regulatory position.[18]

Regulatory capture is the co-opting of regulatory agencies by members of or the entire regulated industry. Rent seeking and rational ignorance are two of the mechanisms which allow this to happen.

Regulatory risk is the risk faced by private-sector firms that regulatory changes will hurt their business.[19]

The World Bank Institute suggests that increased government size is associated with more political corruption even in stable democracies with high income, robust rule of law mechanisms, transparency, and media freedom.[20][page needed]

See also


  1. ^ Orbach, Barak (2013). "What Is Government Failure," Yale Journal on Regulation Online, 30, pp. 44-56.
  2. ^ Id.
  3. ^ Bator, Francis M. (1958). "The Anatomy of Market Failure," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(3), pp. 351-379.
  4. ^ Wolf, Jr., Charles (1979). "A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, 22(1), pp. 107-139.
  5. ^ Orbach (2013).
  6. ^ Weimer and Vining (2004). Policy Analysis and Concepts. 4th edition p. 206.
  7. ^ Coase, Ronald (1964). "The Regulated Industries: Discussion," American Economic Review, 54(2), p. 195, as quoted in Oliver E. Williamson (2002), "The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering," American Economic Review, 92(2), pp. 438-443.
  8. ^ McKean, Roland N. (1965), "The Unseen Hand in Government," "American Economic Review," 55(3), pp, 496-506.
  9. ^ o Charles J. Wolf, (1979). "A Theory of Non-Market Failure," Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (1), pp. 107-139.
      o _____ (2003). Markets Or Governments: Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives, MIT Press. Description and chapter-preview links.
      o Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri (1990). "Market Failure and Government Failure." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(3), pp. 25-39[permanent dead link].
      o Aidan R. Vining and David L. Weimer (1990). "Government Supply and Government Production Failure: A Framework Based on Contestability," Journal of Public Policy Journal of Public Policy, 10(1), pp 1-22. Abstract.
      o Joseph E. Stiglitz (1998). "The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(2), pp. 3-22.
      o Richard O. Zerbe Jr. and Howard E. McCurdy (1999). "The Failure of Market Failure," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(4), pp. 558-578. Abstract. Reprinted in Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics," pp. 164-87.
      o Clifford Winston (2006).
    Government Failure versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance. Brookings Institution Press. Link.
  10. ^ o Anne O. Krueger (1990). "Government Failures in Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(3), pp. 9-23.
      o Eduardo Wiesner (1998). "Transaction Cost Economics and Public Sector Rent-Seeking in Developing Countries: Toward a Theory of Government Failure," in E. Wiesner and R. Picciotto, ed. Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension, pp. 108-23. World Bank.
  11. ^ Thomas Andersson (1991). "Government Failure - the Cause of Global Environmental Mismanagement," Ecological Economics, 4(3), pp. 215-236. Abstract.
  12. ^ o Julian Le Grand (1991). "The Theory of Government Failure," British Journal of Political Science, 21(4), pp. 423-442.
      o Eduardo Wiesner (1998). "Transaction Cost Economics and Public Sector Rent-Seeking in Developing Countries: Toward a Theory of Government Failure," in E. Wiesner and R. Picciotto, ed. Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension, pp. 108-23. World Bank.
  13. ^ o Oliver E. Williamson (1995). "The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency," Greek Economic Review, December, 17, pp. 115-136, reprinted in Williamson (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, ch. 8, pp. 195- 218.
       o Sturzenegger, Federico, and Mariano Tommasi (1998). The Polítical Economy of Reform, MIT Press. Description Archived 2012-10-11 at the Wayback Machine. and links to chapter-previews and "failure".
       o Sharun W. Mukand (2008). "policy reform, political economy of," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
       o Buchanan James M. (2008). "public debt," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics , 2nd Edition The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008), 2nd Edition.Abstract.
  14. ^ o Buchanan James M. (1983). "The Achievement and the Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform," in Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, ed. Horst Hanusch (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983), pp. 15-25.
      o Gordon Tullock et al. (2002), Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice, Cato Institute. Description and scroll-down for preview.
  15. ^ Richard O. Zerbe Jr. and Howard E. McCurdy (1999). "The Failure of Market Failure," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(4), pp. 558-578. Abstract. Reprinted in Zerbe (2001), Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics," pp. 164-87.
  16. ^ Connolly, S. & Munro, A. (1999). 'Public Choice', Chapter 8 in Economics of the Public Sector, Pearson, Harlow, Essex.
  17. ^ o Blanchard, Olivier Jean (2008). "crowding out," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
        o Shaghil Ahmed (1986). "Temporary and Permanent Government Spending in an Open Economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, 17(2). pp. 197-224)
  18. ^ o Stephen Breyer (1979). "Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform," Harvard Law Review, 92(3), pp. 547-609.
       o Joseph E. Stiglitz (2009). "Regulation and Failure," in David Moss and John Cisternino (eds.), New Perspectives on Regulation, ch. 1, pp. 11-23. Cambridge: The Tobin Project.
  19. ^ "Regulatory risk". Retrieved . 
  20. ^ Hamilton, Alexander (2013). Small is Beautiful, at Least in High-Income Democracies: The Distribution of Policy-Making Responsibility, Electoral Accountability, and Incentives for Rent Extraction, The World Bank Institute. Policy Research Working Paper 6305


  • Aidt, Toke S. (2003). "Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey," Economic Journal, 113(491), Features, pp. F632-F652.
  • Becker, Gary (1958) "Competition and Democracy," Journal of Law and Economics, 1, pp. 105-109.
  • _____ (1983). "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), pp. 371-400.
  • Dollery, Brian, and Andrew Worthington (1996). "The Evaluation of Public Policy: Normative Economic Theories of Government Failure," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 7(1), pp. 27-39.
  • Grier, Robin M. and, Kevin B. Grier "Political cycles in nontraditional settings: theory and evidence from the case of Mexico", JLE vol. XLIII (April 2000), p. 239
  • Kolko, Gabriel (1977), The Triumph of Conservatism, The Free Press, ISBN 0-02-916650-0
  • Kolko, Gabriel (1977), Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, Greenwood Publishing Company, ISBN 0-8371-8885-7
  • The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008), 2nd Edition with Table of Contents/Abstract links:
        "laissez-faire, economists and" by Roger E. Backhouse and Steven G. Medema
        "rational choice and political science" by Susanne Lohmann.
  • Niskanen, William (1967), The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, Institute for Defense Analyses, Program Analysis Division (1967), ASIN B0007H5TBG
  • _____ (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, Atherton, ISBN 0-202-06040-3

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