Mimamsa

Mimamsa (IAST: M?m??s?) is a Sanskrit word that means "reflection" or "critical investigation".[1][2] Also known as P?rva-M?m??s? or Karma-M?m??s?,[3]) it is one of six orthodox (astika) schools of Hinduism. The school is known for its philosophical theories on the nature of dharma, based on hermeneutics of the Vedas.[4] The M?m??s? school was foundational and influential for the ved?ntic schools, which were also known as Uttara-M?m??s?. The differences were that the M?m??s? school developed and emphasized karmak???a, or the study of ritual actions, using the four early Vedas, while the Ved?nta schools developed and emphasized jñanak???a, the study of knowledge and spirituality, using the later parts of Vedas like the Upani?ads.[4]

M?m??s? has several sub-schools, each defined by its epistemology. The Pr?bh?kara sub-school, which takes its name from the seventh-century philosopher Prabh?kara, described the five epistemically reliable means to gaining knowledge: pratyak?a or perception; anum?na or inference; upam??a, by comparison and analogy; arth?patti, the use of postulation and derivation from circumstances; and ?abda, the word or testimony of past or present reliable experts.[5][6] The Bh???a sub-school, from philosopher Kum?rila Bha??a, added a sixth means to its canon; anupalabdhi meant non-perception, or proof by the absence of cognition (e.g., the lack of gunpowder on a suspect's hand)[5][7]

The school of M?m??s? consists of both atheistic and theistic doctrines, but the school showed little interest in systematic examination of the existence of God. Rather, it held that the soul is an eternal, omnipresent, inherently active spiritual essence, and focused on the epistemology and metaphysics of dharma.[3][8][9] For the M?m??s? school, dharma meant rituals and social duties, not devas, or gods, because gods existed only in name.[3] The M?m??sakas also held that Vedas are "eternal, authorless, [and] infallible", that Vedic vidhi, or injunctions and mantras in rituals are prescriptive k?rya or actions, and the rituals are of primary importance and merit. They considered the Upani?ads and other texts related to self-knowledge and spirituality as subsidiary, a philosophical view that Ved?nta disagreed with.[4][3]

M?m??s? gave rise to the study of philology and the philosophy of language.[10] While their deep analysis of language and linguistics influenced other schools of Hinduism,[11] their views were not shared by others. M?m??sakas considered the purpose and power of language was to clearly prescribe the proper, correct and right. In contrast, Ved?ntins extended the scope and value of language as a tool to also describe, develop and derive.[3] M?m??sakas considered orderly, law driven, procedural life as central purpose and noblest necessity of dharma and society, and divine (theistic) sustenance means to that end.

The M?m??s? school is a form of philosophical realism.[12] A key text of the M?m??s? school is the M?m??s? S?tra of Jaimini.[3][13]

Terminology

M?m??s?, also romanised Mimansa[14] or Mimamsa,[2] means "reflection, consideration, profound thought, investigation, examination, discussion" in Sanskrit.[15] It also refers to the "examination of the Vedic text"[15] and to a school of Hindu philosophy that is also known as P?rva M?m??s? ("prior" inquiry, also Karma-M?m??s?), in contrast to Uttara M?m??s? ("posterior" inquiry, also Jñana-M?m??s?) - the opposing school of Vedanta. This division is based on classification of the Vedic texts into karmak???a, the early sections of the Veda treating of mantras and rituals (Samhitas and Brahmanas), and the jñ?nak???a dealing with the meditation, reflection and knowledge of Self, Oneness, Brahman (the Upani?ads).[4][13] Between the Samhitas and Brahmanas, the M?m??s? school places greater emphasis to the Brahmanas - the part of Vedas that is a commentary on Vedic rituals.[16]

Donald Davis translates M?m??s? as the "desire to think", and in colloquial historical context as "how to think and interpret things".[17] In the last centuries of the 1st-millennium BCE, the word M?m??s? began to denote the thoughts on and interpretation of the Vedas, first as P?rva-M?m??s? for rituals portions in the earlier layers of texts in the Vedas, and as Uttara-M?m??s? for the philosophical portions in the last layers.[17][18] Over time, P?rva-M?m??s? was just known as the M?m??s? school, and the Uttara-M?m??s? as the Vedanta school.[18]

The scholars of M?m??s? school are referred to as M?m??s?kas.[19]

Dar?ana (philosophy) - central concerns

Mimamsa is one of the six classical Hindu dar?anas. It is among the earliest schools of Hindu philosophies.[2] It has attracted relatively less scholarly study, although its theories and particularly its questions on exegesis and theology have been highly influential on all classical Indian philosophies.[20][21][22] Its analysis of language has been of central importance to the legal literature of India.[23]

Ancient Mimamsa's central concern was epistemology (pramana), that is what are the reliable means to knowledge. It debated not only "how does man ever learn or know, whatever he knows", but also whether the nature of all knowledge is inherently circular, whether those such as foundationalists who critique the validity of any "justified beliefs" and knowledge system make flawed presumptions of the very premises they critique, and how to correctly interpret and avoid incorrectly interpreting dharma texts such as the Vedas.[24] It asked questions such as "what is devata (god)?", "are rituals dedicated to devatas efficacious?", "what makes anything efficacious?", and "can it be proved that the Vedas, or any canonical text in any system of thought, fallible or infallible (svatah pramanya, intrinsically valid)?, if so, how?" and others.[25][26] To Mimamsa scholars, the nature of non-empirical knowledge and human means to it are such that one can never demonstrate certainty, one can only falsify knowledge claims, in some cases.[27] According to Francis Clooney, a professor at Harvard Divinity School specializing on Hinduism, the Mimamsa school is "one of the most distinctively Hindu forms of thinking; it is without real parallel elsewhere in the world".[19]

The central text of the Mimamsa school is Jamini's Mimamsa Sutras, along with the historically influential commentaries on this sutra by Sabara and by Kumarila Bhatta.[19][28] Together, these texts develop and apply the rules of language analysis (such as the rules of contradiction), asserting that one must not only examine injunctive propositions in any scripture, but also examine the alternate related or reverse propositions for better understanding. They suggested that to reach correct and valid knowledge it is not only sufficient to demand proof of a proposition, it is important to give proof of a proposition's negative as well as declare and prove one's own preferred propositions. Further, they asserted that whenever perception is not the means of direct proof and knowledge, one cannot prove such non-empirical propositions to be "true or not true", rather one can only prove a non-empirical proposition is "false, not false, or uncertain".[29]

For example, the Mimamsakas welcome not only the demand for proof of an injunctive proposition such as "agnihotra ritual leads one to heaven", but suggest that one must examine and prove alternate propositions such as "ritual does not lead one to heaven", "something else leads one to heaven", "there is heaven", "there is no heaven" and so on. The Mimamsa literature states that if satisfactory, verifiable proof for all of such propositions cannot be found by its proponents and its opponents, then the proposition needs to be accepted as a part of a "belief system".[28][30] Beliefs, such as those in the scriptures (Vedas), must be accepted to be true unless its opponents can demonstrate the proof of validity of their own texts or teacher(s) these opponents presume to be prima facie justified, and until these opponents can demonstrate that the scriptures they challenge are false. If they do not try to do so, it is hypocrisy; if they try to do so, it can only lead to infinite regress, according to the Mimamsakas.[24][31] Any historic scripture with widespread social acceptance, according to Mimamsaka, is an activity of communication (vyavaharapravrtti) and is accepted as authoritative because it is socially validated practice, unless perceptually verifiable evidence emerges that proves parts or all of it as false or harmful.[32]

The Mimamsakas were predominantly concerned with the central motivation of human beings, the highest good, and actions that make this possible.[33] They stated that human beings seek niratisaya priti (unending ecstatic pleasure, joy, happiness) in this life and the next. They argued that this highest good is the result of one's own ethical actions (dharma), that such actions are what the Vedic sentences contain and communicate, and therefore it important to properly interpret and understand Vedic sentences, words and meaning.[33][34] The Mimamsa scholarship was centrally concerned with the philosophy of language, how human beings learn and communicate with each other and across generations with language in order to act in a manner that enables them to achieve that which motivates them.[35][36] The Mimamsa school focussed on dharma, deriving ethics and activity from the karma-kanda (rituals) part of the Vedas, with the argument that ethics for this life and efficacious action for svarga (heaven) cannot be derived from sense-perception, and can only be derived from experience, reflection and understanding of past teachings.[37]

In every human activity, the motivating force to perform an action is his innate longing for priti (pleasure, happiness[38]),
whether at the lowest level or the highest level.
At the highest level, it is nothing but an unsurpassed state of priti,
which is ensured only by performing ethical actions.

- Sabara, 2nd century Mimamsa scholar[39]

According to Daniel Arnold, the Mimamsa scholarship has "striking affinities" with that of William Alston, the 20th century Western philosopher, along with some notable differences.[40] The Mimamsakas subjected to a radical critique, more than two thousand years ago, states Francis Clooney, the notions such as "God," the "sacred text," the "author" and the "anthropocentric ordering of reality".[41]

Epistemology

In the field of epistemology, later Mim??s?kas made some notable contributions. Unlike the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the Pr?bh?kara sub-school of M?m??s? recognizes five means of valid knowledge (Skt. pram??a). The Bh???a sub-school of M?m??s? recognizes one additional sixth, namely anuapalabdhi, just like Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. These six epistemically reliable means of gaining knowledge are:

Pratyaksa

Main article : Pratyaksha

Pratyak?a (???????????) means perception. It is of two types in Mimamsa and other schools of Hinduism: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[42][43] The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:[44]Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[44] Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[45] Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyak?a-pramana, so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment).[46]

Anumana

Main article : Anumana

Anum??a (??????) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.[47] Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana.[42] In all except one Hindu philosophies,[48] this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples).[49] The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha.[49][50] A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).[51]

Upamana

Main article : Upam??a

Upam??a means comparison and analogy.[5][6] Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge.[52]Upamana, states Lochtefeld,[53] may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.[53] The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya.[54] Thus, explains Monier Monier-Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and charmingness is samanya. The 7th century text Bha??ik?vya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.[54] In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upanama and their value in epistemology are debated.

Arthapatti

Arth?patti (??????????) means postulation, derivation from circumstances.[5][6] In contemporary logic, this pramana is similar to circumstantial implication.[55] As example, if a person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted.[56] However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti found in the texts of M?m??s? and other schools of Hinduism is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge.[57] The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.[58]

Anupalabdi

Main article : Anupalabdhi, See also: Abhava

Anupalabdi (?????????), accepted only by Kumarila Bhatta sub-school of M?m??s?, means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof.[59]Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means.[60] In the two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa (positive) or asadrupa (negative) relation - both correct and valuable. Like other pramana, Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a pramana. The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.[61]

Abhava (????) means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be same as Abhava,[5] while others consider Anupalabdi and Abhava as different.[61][62]Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of Padartha (??????, referent of a term). A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva (existent), Jneyatva (knowable) and Abhidheyatva (nameable).[63] Specific examples of padartha, states Bartley, include dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (activity/motion), samanya/jati (universal/class property), samavaya (inherence) and vishesha (individuality). Abhava is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to "referents of positive expression" in Padartha.[63] An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. Abhava was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa (termination of what existed), atyanta-abhava (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), anyonya-abhava (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and pragavasa (prior, antecedent non-existence).[63][64]

Sabda

?abda (????) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts.[5][59] Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.[65] He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words).[65] The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources.[59][65] The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.[66]

Relation to Vedanta school

An interesting feature of the Mim??s? school of philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true (Skt. svata?pr?m??yav?da). Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mim??s?kas advocate the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jñapti). Not only did the Mim??s?kas make the very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas, but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this particular Mim??s? contribution.[]

Metaphysics and beliefs

The core tenets of P?rva M?m??s? are ritualism (orthopraxy), anti-asceticism and anti-mysticism. The central aim of the school is elucidation of the nature of dharma, understood as a set ritual obligations and prerogatives to be performed properly.

Atheism

M?m??s? theorists decided that the evidence allegedly proving the existence of God was insufficient. They argue that there was no need to postulate a maker for the world, just as there was no need for an author to compose the Vedas or a God to validate the rituals.[67] M?m??s? argues that the Gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the mantras that speak their names. To that regard, the power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of Gods.[68]

Dharma

Dharma as understood by P?rva M?m??s? can be loosely translated into English as "virtue", "morality" or "duty". The P?rva M?m??s? school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal cognition (i.e. knowledge of words and meanings) according to Vedas. In this respect it is related to the Ny?ya school, the latter, however, accepts only four sources of knowledge (pram??a) as valid.[69]

The P?rva M?m??s? school held dharma to be equivalent to following the prescriptions of the Sa?hit?s and their Br?hma?a commentaries relating the correct performance of Vedic rituals. Seen in this light, P?rva M?m??s? is essentially ritualist (orthopraxy), placing great weight on the performance of karma or action as enjoined by the Vedas.

Relation to Ved?nta

Emphasis of Yajnic Karmak???as in P?rva M?m??s? is erroneously interpreted by some to be an opposition to Jñ?nak???a of Ved?nta and Upani?ads. P?rva M?m??s? does not discuss topics related to Jñ?nak???a, such as salvation (mok?a), but it never speaks against mok?a. Ved?nta quotes Jaimini's belief in Brahman as well as in mok?a:

In Uttara-M?m??s? or Ved?nta (4.4.5-7), B??ar?ya?a cites Jaimini as saying (????????? ?????????????????????) "(The mukta Puru?a is united with the Brahman) as if it were like the Brahman, because descriptions (in ?ruti etc) prove so".

In Ved?nta (1.2.28), B??ar?ya?a cites Jaimini as saying that "There is no contradiction in taking Vaishv?nara as the supreme Brahman".

In 1.2.31, Jaimini is again quoted by B??ar?yana as saying that the nirguna (attribute-less) Brahman can manifest itself as having a form.

In 4.3.12, B?dar?yana again cites Jaimini as saying that the mukta Purusha attains Brahman.

In P?rva M?m??s? too, Jaimini emphasises the importance of faith in and attachment to the Omnipotent Supreme Being Whom Jaimini calls "The Omnipotent Pradhaana" (The Main):

P?rva M?m??s? 6.3.1: "sarva?aktau prav?tti? sy?t tath?bh?topade??t" (????????? ?????????? ?????? ??????????????). The term upade?a here means instructions of the ??stras as taught. We should tend towards the omnipotent supreme being. In the context of P?rva M?m??s? 6.3.1 shown above, next two sutras becomes significant, in which this Omnipotent Being is termed as "pradh?na", and keeping away from Him is said to be a "do?a", hence all beings are asked to get related ("abhisambandh?t" in tadakarma?i ca do?as tasm?t tato vi?e?a? sy?t pradh?nen?bhisambandh?t; Jaimini 6, 3.3) to the "Omnipotent Main Being" (api v?py ekade?e sy?t pradh?ne hy arthanirv?ttir gu?am?tram itarat tadarthatv?t; Jaimini 6, 3.2). Karma-M?m??s? supports the Vedas, and Rgveda says that one Truth is variously named by the sages. It is irrelevant whether we call Him as Pradh?na or Brahman or Vaishv?nara or Shiva or God.

History

The school's origins lie in the scholarly traditions of the final centuries BCE, when the priestly ritualism of Vedic sacrifice was being marginalized by Buddhism and Vedanta.[] To counteract this challenge, several groups emerged dedicated to demonstrating the validity of the Vedic texts by rigid formulation of rules for their interpretation. The school gathers momentum in the Gupta period with ??bara, and reaches its apex in the 7th to 8th centuries with Kum?rila Bha??a and Prabh?kara.[]

The school for some time in the Early Middle Ages exerted near-dominant influence on learned Hindu thought, and is credited as a major force contributing to the decline of Buddhism in India, but it has fallen into decline in the High Middle Ages and today is all but eclipsed by Vedanta.[70]

Mimamsa texts

The foundational text for the M?m??s? school is the Purva M?m??s? Sutras of Jaimini (ca. 3rd to 1st century BCE). A major commentary was composed by ??bara in ca. the 5th or 6th century CE. The school reaches its height with Kum?rila Bha??a and Prabh?kara (fl. ca. 700 CE). Both Kumarila Bhatta and Prabh?kara (along with Mur?ri, whose work is no more extant) have written extensive commentaries on ??bara's M?m??s?s?trabh??yam. Kum?rila Bha??a, Mandana Mi?ra, P?rthas?rathi Mi?ra, Sucarita Mi?ra, Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta, Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of the Mimamsa Scholars.

The M?m??s? S?tra of Jaimini (c. 3rd century BCE) has summed up the general rules of ny?ya for Vedic interpretation. The text has 12 chapters, of which the first chapter is of philosophical value. The commentaries on the M?m??s? S?tra by Bhart?mitra, Bhavad?sa, Hari and Upavar?a are no more extant. ?abara (c. 1st century BCE) is the first commentator of the M?m??s? S?tra, whose work is available to us. His bh??ya is the basis of all later works of M?m??s? . Kum?rila Bha??a (7th century CE), the founder of the first school of the M?m??s? commented on both the S?tra and its ?abara Bh??ya. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the ?lokav?rttika, the Tantrav?rttika and the ?up??k?. Man?ana Mi?ra (8th century CE) was a follower of Kum?rila, who wrote Vidhiviveka and M?m??s?nukrama??. There are several commentaries on the works of Kum?rila. Sucarita Mi?ra wrote a K??ik? (commentary) on the ?lokav?rttika. Some?vara Bhatta wrote Ny?yasudh?, also known as R??aka, a commentary on the Tantrav?rttika. P?rthasarathi Mi?ra wrote Ny?yaratn?kara (1300 CE), another commentary on the ?lokav?rttika. He also wrote ??strad?pik?, an independent work on the M?m??s? and Tantraratna. Venka?a D?k?ita's V?rttikabhara?ya is a commentary on the ?up??k?. Prabh?kara (8th century CE), the originator of the second school of the M?m??s? wrote his commentary B?hat? on the ?abara Bh??ya. ??likan?tha's ?juvimal? (9th century CE) is a commentary on the B?hat?. His Prakara?apañcik? is an independent work of this school and the Pari?i??a is a brief explanation of the ?abara Bh??ya. Bhavan?tha's Ny?yaviveka deals with the views of this school in details. The founder of the third school of the M?m??s? was Mur?ri, whose works have not reached us.

?padeva (17th century) wrote an elementary work on the M?m??s?, known as M?m??s?ny?yapraka?a or ?padev?. Arthasa?graha of Laug?k?i Bh?skara is based on the ?padev?. Ved?nta De?ika's ?e?vara M?m??s? was an attempt to combine the views of the M?m??s? and the Ved?nta schools.[71]

See also

References

  1. ^ Mimamsa Meriam-Webster Dictionary (2011)
  2. ^ a b c Mimamsa Encyclopædia Britannica (2014)
  3. ^ a b c d e f Chris Bartley (2013), Purva Mimamsa, in Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, 978-0415862530, page 443-445
  4. ^ a b c d Oliver Leaman (2006), Shruti, in Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415862530, page 503
  5. ^ a b c d e f DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, ISBN 978-1-4419-8109-7, page 172
  6. ^ a b c Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225
  7. ^ John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
  8. ^ Neville, Robert (2001). Religious truth. SUNY Press. 
  9. ^ Worthington, Vivian (1982). A history of yoga. Routledge. p. 66. ISBN 9780710092588. 
  10. ^ Peter M. Scharf, The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy (1996), Chapter 3
  11. ^ Annette Wilke and Oliver Moebus (2011), Sound and Communication: An Aesthetic Cultural History of Sanskrit Hinduism, Walter de Gruyter GmbH (Berlin), ISBN 978-3110181593, pages 23-24, 551-663
  12. ^ M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 323-325
  13. ^ a b M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 298-335
  14. ^ M.C. Nyayaratna (1863). The Mimansa Darsana. Bishop's College Press. pp. Cover Page. 
  15. ^ a b Mimamsa, Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon (Germany)
  16. ^ M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 299
  17. ^ a b Donald R. Davis, Jr (2010). The Spirit of Hindu Law. Cambridge University Press. pp. 47-48. ISBN 978-1-139-48531-9. 
  18. ^ a b Francis Xavier Clooney (1990). Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the P?rva M?m??s? of Jaimini. De Nobili, Vienna. pp. 25-28. ISBN 978-3-900271-21-3. 
  19. ^ a b c Francis X. Clooney 1997, p. 337.
  20. ^ Francis X. Clooney 1997, pp. 337-340.
  21. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 26-31.
  22. ^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 57-61, 89-98.
  23. ^ Maurice Winternitz (1963). History of Indian Literature. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 511-512. ISBN 978-81-208-0056-4. 
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  25. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 26-33.
  26. ^ Francis X. Clooney 1997, pp. 337-342.
  27. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 27, 29-30.
  28. ^ a b Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 27-29.
  29. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 28-35.
  30. ^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 57-79.
  31. ^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 89-114.
  32. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 31-33, 36-38.
  33. ^ a b Prasad 1994, pp. 317-318.
  34. ^ P. T. Raju 1985, pp. 17, 41-47, 61-63, Quote (p. 62): "The ideal life, according to the Mimamsa, is thus a life of continuous ethical activity and enjoyment of its fruits.".
  35. ^ Prasad 1994, pp. 317-319.
  36. ^ J.F. Staal 1976, pp. 112-117.
  37. ^ Shyam Ranganathan 2007, pp. 298-302, 348-349.
  38. ^ Jan Gonda, Johannes Bronkhorst and Elisa Freschi translate "priti" as happiness; e.g. see, Elisa Freschi (2012). Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prabhakara Mimamsa. BRILL Academic. p. 380. ISBN 978-90-04-22260-1. 
  39. ^ Prasad 1994, p. 339 note 5, Mimamsasutrabhasya 4.3.15.
  40. ^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 41-43.
  41. ^ Francis X. Clooney (1987). "Why the Veda Has No Author: Language as Ritual in Early M?m??s? and Post-Modern Theology". Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 55 (4): 660-661. 
  42. ^ a b MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  43. ^ B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0198239765
  44. ^ a b Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 160-168
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  46. ^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 170-172
  47. ^ W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, ISBN 0-7914-0362-9, page 26-27
  48. ^ Carvaka school is the exception
  49. ^ a b James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page 46-47
  50. ^ Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0779-0
  51. ^ Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61
  52. ^ VN Jha (1986), "The upamana-pramana in Purvamimamsa", SILLE, pages 77-91
  53. ^ a b James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page 721
  54. ^ a b Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457-458
  55. ^ Arthapatti Encyclopædia Britannica (2012)
  56. ^ James Lochtefeld, "Arthapatti" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page 55
  57. ^ Stephen Phillips (1996), Classical Indian Metaphysics, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120814899, pages 41-63
  58. ^ DM Datta (1932), The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical study of the Advaita theory of knowledge, University of Calcutta, Reprinted in 1992 as ISBN 978-8120835269, pages 221-253
  59. ^ a b c
    • Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
    • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
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  61. ^ a b D Sharma (1966), Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic -- Abh?va versus Anupalabdhi, Indo-Iranian Journal, 9(4): 291-300
  62. ^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 155-174, 227-255
  63. ^ a b c Chris Bartley (2013), Padartha, in Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, ISBN 978-0415862530, pages 415-416
  64. ^ Mohan Lal (Editor), The Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature, Vol. 5, Sahitya Akademy, ISBN 81-260-1221-8, page 3958
  65. ^ a b c M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120813304, page 43
  66. ^ P. Billimoria (1988), ?abdapram??a: Word and Knowledge, Studies of Classical India Volume 10, Springer, ISBN 978-94-010-7810-8, pages 1-30
  67. ^ Neville, Robert (2001). Religious truth. p. 51. ISBN 9780791447789. 
  68. ^ Coward, Harold (2008-02-07). The perfectibility of human nature in eastern and western thought. p. 114. ISBN 9780791473368. 
  69. ^ Kapoor, Subodh (2004). The Philosophy Of Vaisnavism. Cosmo Publications. p. 60. ISBN 978-81-7755-886-9. 
  70. ^ Göhler (1995), p. 5f.
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