This article has multiple issues. Please help talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these template messages)( or discuss these issues on the Learn how and when to remove this template message)
Naskh () is an Arabic word usually translated as "abrogation"; It refers to the theory in Islamic legal exegesis whereby seemingly contradictory material within, or between, the two primary sources of Islamic law -- the Quran and the Sunnah -- are resolved by superseding or canceling the earlier revelation. Several Qur'anic verses state that some revelations have been abrogated and superseded by later revelations, which are understood by many Muslim scholars as pertaining to the verses of the Quran itself. Some examples include a gradual ban on consumption of alcohol and a change in qibla (the direction someone praying salat should face) from Jerusalem to Mecca.
With few exceptions, neither the Quran, nor recorded sayings and doings of Muhammad (known as ahadith) that make up the Sunnah, state which Quranic verses or ahadith have been abrogated. However narrations from Muhammad's companions mention abrogated verses or rulings of the religion; and the principle of abrogation of an older verse by a new verse in the Quran, or within the Hadiths, was an established principle in Sharia at least by the 9th century. The possibility of abrogation between these two primary sources of Islam (the Quran and Sunnah) has been a more contentious issue. The allowability of abrogation between sources has been one of the major differences between the Shafi'i and Hanafi schools of fiqh (jurisprudence), with Shafi'i forbidding abrogation of the Qur'?n by the Sunnah, and the Hanafi allowing it.
Naskh has been defined as
According to some Muslim sources (Quran Academy, Abu Amina Elias, etc. ) the early generations of Muslims (Salaf) "would often use the word abrogation" in the sense of "specification, exception, or clarification," rather than totally canceling out a verse.
Descriptions of Naskh by Sunni legal theorists of the tenth and eleventh centuries include:
Words containing the root stem n-s-kh occur four times within the Qur'?n -- in verses 7:154, 45:29, 22:52, and 2:106. The first two occurrences come in the context of texts and scribal activity: "in the writing [nuskhah] thereon" (Q.7:154) and "For We were wont to put on Record [nastansikh] all that ye did" (Q.45:29).
The Quran contains two "verses of abrogation", which establish the principle in Islam that an older verse may be abrogated and substituted with a new verse, a principle that has been historically accepted and applied by vast majority of Islamic jurists on both the Quran and the Sunnah.
When We substitute one revelation for another, - and Allah knows best what He reveals (in stages),- they say, "Thou art but a forger": but most of them understand not.
Other verses believed to indicate the principle of naskh are
(The verse 16:101 was employed by Imam Shafi'i, (the founder of the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (madhhab)), in his theory of abrogation between sources as proof that a Qur'?nic verse can only be abrogated by another Qur'?nic verse.)
An indication of why (at least) one Quranic verse was abrogated is found in 22:52.
Never did We send a messenger or a prophet before thee, but, when he framed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire: but Allah will cancel anything (vain) that Satan throws in, and Allah will confirm (and establish) His Signs: for Allah is full of Knowledge and Wisdom.
This verse, cited by Tabar? in connection with the incident of the so-called "Satanic Verses", supported an interpretation of naskh as eradication (iz?la) from the Mus'haf of the Quran and thus made acceptable the idea of naskh as the nullification of a verse and ruling -- naskh al-hukm wa-'l-til?wa -- without any replacement. According to John Burton, Tabar?'s interpretation (Tafs?r), states that God removed some of the early verses that the devil had cast into the Quran and replaced them in later verses.
Ibn Taymiyyah also identified the form of naskh where a satanic verse ("something that Satan has managed to insinuate into Revelation through Prophetic error") is canceled by a divine one, (which he calls al-naw' al-ikharmin al-naskh).
Later exegetes such as Makk? insist that verse 22:52 does not indicate the Islamic legitimacy of the concept of naskh for divine revelation but only shows that God eradicated with later recital what the Devil insinuated into the Prophet's recital. These Islamic scholars relegated verse 22:52 of the Quran to merely lexical significance.
Many cases of naskh depend on "the agreement of scholars" to determine if a verse was abrogated, and on Tafsir reports or the recollection of Hadith transmitters to explain what verse or prophetic statement was revealed before another. However, one Quranic verse and one hadith specifically mention some earlier command to be abrogated and replaced with another -- though they do not use any form of the word naskh.
Quranic verse 2:143-50 commands Muhammad and the Muslims to turn their faces away from 'the direction of prayer that you faced before' (Jerusalem) to a new one, one that 'pleases your heart,' (by which is meant the Al-Haram Mosque of Mecca). In one hadith Muhammad changes an earlier command to his followers: 'I had prohibited you from visiting graves, but visit them, for indeed in visiting them there is a reminder [of death].' 
The scope of the doctrine of Naskh has been controversial, and some Islamic scholars (a minority) disagree with its premise, usage and applicability. The Quran was revealed by Muhammad over 23 years, while sunnah in the Hadiths traditionally are held as the sayings and practices of Muhammad over this same period. From the early period of Islam's history, scholars noted that certain early verses and later verses covered the same topic, but were contradictory in their requirements. The contradictory commands exist in the Quran, among ahadith of the sunnah, as well as between verses of the Quran and the ahadith of the sunnah.
Since "a defining claim of Sunni Islam" is that no two authentic hadith could contradict each other or the Quran (and nothing in the Quran could contradict anything else in the Quran), scholars worked to resolve these apparent contradictions.
Working with ahadith, scholars first strove to "harmonize" these, i.e. to make them fit together by reinterpreting them. If that failed they would look for signs of abrogation (that one saying/doing/inaction by Muhammad was earlier than the other and had been replaced by the later saying/doing/inaction). If there was no opportunity for abrogation, they would check the isnad -- chains of transmission of the ahadith -- to see if the transmission of one hadith was superior to another. Finally, if the isnad were not different they would approve the hadith that seemed "closest to the overall message of the Quran and Sunnah".
Preachers argue that different situations encountered over the course of Muhammad's more than two decade term as prophet required new rulings to meet the Muslim community's changing circumstances. (Or, since God is all knowing, the expiration points of those rulings God intended as temporary all along were reached.) J.A.C. Brown calls Naskh an expression of "the notion that aspects of the Quran's message and the Prophet's teachings developed over time". Abu Amina Elias states that naskh is a recognition "that one rule might not always be suitable for every situation. Far from Allah changing his mind, abrogation demonstrates the wisdom of Allah in legislating rules for their appropriate time and context. For most rules in Islam, there exist circumstances that warrant an exception to the rule."
Naskh applies to only the regulative verses of the Islamic scriptures. In Tabar?'s words:
God alters what was once declared lawful into unlawful, or vice-versa; what was legally unregulated into prohibited and vice-versa. But such changes can occur only in verses conveying commands, positive and negative. Verses cast in the indicative and conveying narrative statements, can be affected by neither n?sikh [abrogating material] nor mans?kh [abrogated material].
According to scholar Recep Dogan, the "three types of evidence" allowed for naskh are a) report from Muhammad or companions, b) "ijma (consensus of the mujtahids upon naskh) and c) knowledge of the chronology of the Qur'anic revelation".
The plausibility and validity of abrogation is determined through a chronological study of the primary sources, where early revelations are considered invalid and overruled by later revelations. This has historically been a difficult task because the verses in the Qur'an are not arranged by chronology but rather by size of chapters, and even within a chapter, the verses are non-chronologically arranged. The verses 2:190, 2:191 and 2:192, for example, were revealed to Muhammad six years after the verse 2:193. Thus, the context of each revelation is not ascertainable from verses near a verse, or the sequential verse number.
Andrew Rippin complains that naskh texts in Islam do not demonstrate that verses rendered invalid by shariah law were revealed earlier, but simply assume they must be.
A classic example of this is the early community's increasingly belligerent posture towards its pagan and Jewish neighbors:
Many verses counsel patience in the face of the mockery of the unbelievers, while other verses incite to warfare against the unbelievers. The former are linked to the [chronologically anterior] Meccan phase of the mission when the Muslims were too few and weak to do other than endure insult; the latter are linked to Medina where the Prophet had acquired the numbers and the strength to hit back at his enemies. The discrepancy between the two sets of verses indicates that different situations call for different regulations.
This is explained by Yasir Qadhi explains that one reason for the difference in number of abrogated verses comes from a confusion over "naskh" (abrogation) and "takhsees" (clarification). Qadhi cites the following as an example of "takhsees": verse 8:1 says the "spoils are for Allah and His Messenger", whereas 8:41 says "one-fifth is for Allah and His Messenger"; thus verse 8:41 explains 8:1, it doesn't cancel it. Yet many scholars, he says, include clarified verses with abrogated ones to produce a large total of abrogated verses.
Ibn Al-Qayyim and Abu Amina Elias argue that what early Muslims called abrogating was actually interpretation
The general meaning of the righteous predecessors when using the words 'abrogating' and 'abrogated' is sometimes the complete removal of the previous ruling - and this is the technical term of the latter generations - or sometimes the removal of the general, absolute, and outward meaning, whether by specification, restriction, interpreting an absolute as limited, or by explanation and clarification. Even they would refer to is as exceptional and conditional.
A number of reports of prominent early Muslims -- such as Rashidun caliphs 'Umar bin al-Khab and 'Al? bin Ab? lib -- emphasize the importance of studying naskh. In one report Ali told a judge who had no knowledge of nasikh that he was "deluded and misleading others", in another he evicted a preacher from a mosque for being ignorant of the science of abrogation. Umar is reported to have told Muslims that despite the fact that Ubay ibn Ka'b was "the best Quranic expert among us" "we ignore some of what" he says because he disregarded abrogation and told others he refused to "abandon anything I heard from the Messenger of Allah".
Islamic scholars have offered a range of opinion as to the technical meaning and usage of Naskh'. These span between suspension with replacement of the old verse (ibd?l) to the nullification of the old verse (ibt?l). To work around this problem exegetes such as Tabar? interpolated hukm (ruling) in place of the word ?ya (verse), arguing that the something being replaced is the ruling not the verse, so that if a ruling is replaced the preservation or not of its wording in the mushaf (written record of Quranic revelation) is immaterial. Alternate interpretations were also suggested for the subordinate clause's "cause to be forgotten" (aw nansah?), such as defer or leave. This was primarily motivated by flight from the theologically repugnant idea of prophetic forgetting, with Q.15:9 cited as evidence of its impossibility. Yet verses Q.17:86, Q.18:24, and Q.87:6-7 may seem to endorse its feasibility. Thus "Qur'?n-forgetting is clearly adumbrated in the Qur'?n". Many ahadith also attest to the phenomenon: entire suras which the Muslims had previously recited, claims one, would one morning be discovered to have been completely erased from memory (cf. Ab? 'Ubaid al-Q?sim b. Sall?m).
Three modes of naskh were proposed by the classical exegetes, which apply when one verse of the Quran is being compared to another conflicting ruling in a verse in the Quran, or when one ruling in the sunnah in a Hadith is being compared to another sunnah: (Naskh concerns itself with only revelations pertaining to positive laws -- commandments (amr) or prohibitions (nahy).)
Abrogation of the ruling but not the wording. A regulation-embodied within either a Qur'?nic verse or a hadith is replaced with a new ruling, but its wording is retained in the scripture, as text within the mushaf. While retaining the text may cause confusion to those inadvertently following the repealed rule, according to Khan, tampering/doctoring with sacred texts has been rejected since medieval times. Of these three modes of naskh, it was the first -- naskh al-hukm d?na al-til?wa -- which received widespread recognition.
Abrogation of both ruling and wording. A ruling is voided and its text omitted from the mushaf. Evidence that the verse ever existed is preserved only within tradition. An example is a report from Aisha stating that "Among the things that were revealed of the Qur'an was that ten definite breastfeedings make a person a mahram [i.e. if a woman breastfeeds a child ten times, that child cannot grow up to marry any of the woman's natural children], then that was abrogated and replaced with five definite breastfeedings, and the Messenger of Allah .... passed away when this was among the things that were still recited of the Qur'an." Narrated by Muslim, 1452. Liaquat Ali Khan states that "very few Muslim jurists concede that any portion of the Quran has been removed" through this mode of abrogation. However, Wahhabi scholar Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid describing these three modes of 'Naskh, and quote two other scholars (Muhammad 'Abd al-'Azeem az-Zarqaani and Ibn 'Atiyyah) who do also. And John Burton writes that this second mode is generally acknowledged, in part due to the many alleged instances of revelatory erasure:
Of special importance were allegations of actual omissions from the revelation such as those recording the "loss" of a verse in praise of the Bi'r Ma'?na martyrs, the Ibn ?dam "verse" and reports on the alleged originally longer versions of s?ras IX or XXXIII, said to have once been as long as s?ra II and to have been the locus of the stoning "verse" [ ?yat al-rajm ]. Lists were compiled of revelations verifiably received by Muhammad and publicly recited during his lifetime until subsequently withdrawn (raf'), with the result that when the divine revelations were finally brought together into book-form, there was collected into the mushaf only what could still be recovered following the death of the Prophet. The mushaf has from the outset been incomplete relative to the revelation, but complete in that we have all that God intended us to have.
Abrogation of the wording but not the ruling. In this mode of abrogation, the text is deleted from the mushaf, but the rule is a still-functional. Proof of the verse's existence is preserved within tradition (i.e through a hadith report) as well as in the Fiqh. This mode raises the question of why a verse important enough to be the basis of immutable hukm (ruling) would disappear from the written Quran. It was accepted by only a minority of scholars. The most prominent alleged instance of this sort of abrogation is the naskh of the so-called ?yat al-rajm, or stoning verse. Adduced to exist from a tradition derived from the caliph 'Umar, the verse provided Qur'?nic sanction for the penalty for adultery found within the Fiqh (i.e. stoning) in contravention to the penalty prescribed by Q.24:2 - flogging.
The postulation of this mode stems (indirectly, however) from the Sh?fi'?'s principle that the Qur'an may not abrogate ahadith or ahadith abrogate the Qur'an:
However strictly Sh?fi'? had approached the question of the feasibility or otherwise of the naskh of the Qur'?n by the Sunnah, the fact cannot be disguised that he had admitted the stoning penalty for adultery into his Fiqh. It is nowhere mentioned in the Qur'?n (Q.24:2) and has no other source than the Sunnah. As Schacht observed, on this point, Sh?fi'?'s theoretical structure collapses. Sh?fi'?'s failure to explain the presence of stoning in the Fiqh which he had inherited exposed his us?l theory to the criticism of follower and opponent alike, leading to its partial abandonment. Ironically, the attempt to ameliorate the us?l position by reconciling the explanation of stoning to the obvious- that the stoning penalty had derived from a stoning-'verse'- led, in turn, to the adoption by followers of non-Sh?fi'? us?l of the rationalizing tag, naskh al-til?wa d?na al-hukm. They needed no such principle, since they sanguinely accepted the feasibility of the naskh of the Qur'?n by the Sunnah.
Though Sh?fi'? thus never in fact postulated the existence of a "stoning verse", in one particular instance he did acknowledge the probability of "abrogation of wording but not ruling", as well as acknowledging Aisha's claim that there was a stoning verse in Quran, which had been lost.
The elimination of earlier verse from the mushaf that is part of the latter two modes of naskh creates a distinction between the Qur'?n as temporally contingent document-i.e. the mushaf- and the Qur'?n as the unity of all revelation ever sent down to Muhammed. According to some exegetes this latter conception is not a wholly abstract one, but is a historical reality.
A fourth mode of naskh, deemed "external," is that between religions. In this mode, some Islamic scholars interpret Muhammad abrogated religious laws handed down by messengers before him from those of Jewish and Christian faiths, in order to, states John Burton, correct the major aberrations in Judaism and Christianity. According to Burton, "that Muhammad accepted a doctrine of external naskh cannot be doubted", since the abrogation verse 2:106 was revealed after a series of verses where Muhammad, among other things, abrogated many aspects of the Jewish Halakha, may intend this sort of naskh. According to Muhammad Sameel 'Abd al-Haqq there are "many" commentators and other scholars who believe that in ayah 2:106 ("None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause it to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar ...") "Our revelations" refers to the revelations before the Qur'an, "something better or similar" refers to the Quran itself.
However, the Arabic word in verses 2:106 and 16:101 that is translated as "revelation" is ayah (i.e. the word used to refer to the verses that make up the surahs of the Quran). The word used to describe the Quran, the Jewish Torah or the Christian New testament is kitab (book).
Frequently cited examples of abrogation of older verses (mans?kh) with newer verses (nasikh) within Qur'?n are:
Examples of inter-Qur'?nic abrogation, where one of the rulings comes from the Sunnah, are:
Al-Sha`rani considered claims of abrogation [to be] "the recourse of those mediocre and narrow-minded jurists whose hearts God had not illuminated with his Light. They could not perceive all the interpretive possibilities in the words of God and the Prophet ... By taking the shortcut of stamping Quranic verses or Hadiths 'abrogated', such ulama had restricted the interpretive plurality that God had intended in the Shariah. For Sha'rani only when a Hadith included the Prophet's own clear abrogation, like his report about visiting graves, could it be considered Naskh.
Shah Wali Allah was similarly skeptical of the ulama's excessive indulgence in abrogation to explain the relationship between Quranic verses or hadiths. In all but five cases, he found explanations for how to understand the relationship between scriptural passages without recourse to abrogation."
According to David Powers, Islamic scholars have asked if inherent in abrogation is not the question of whether the Quran is really the word of an eternal, all-knowing, omniscient, omnipotent God, since such a God would have no need to change His mind (His eternal divine will), and would not reveal something wrong or imperfect in the first place. Why would the Quran -- the creation of omniscient, omnipotent God -- have contradictions within it, or verses in need of being replaced by another?
The "God changing his mind" problem has led a few Islamic scholars to deny the theory of Naskh, declaring the Quran to be perfect and without any contradictions through rationalizing the contradictions and reinterpreting contradictory verses. The vast majority of scholars, however, accept that there are significant contradictions within the Quran, within the Hadiths, between the Quran and the Hadiths, and that the doctrine of abrogation as revealed by the Quran is necessary to establish Sharia.
Among the non-mainstream sects of Islam that rejected naskh were the Mu'tazili, Zaidiyah, and Quranists, on the rationalist grounds that the word of God could not contain contradictions. According to scholar Karel Steenbrink, most twentieth century modernist or reformist scholars, consider the theory "an insult to the integrity and value of the uncreated revelation of God."
More recently the Ahmadiyya also reject the theory of naskh and argue that all Qur'?nic verses have equal validity, in keeping with their emphasis on the "unsurpassable beauty and unquestionable validity of the Qur'?n". The harmonization of apparently incompatible rulings is resolved through their juridical deflation in Ahmad? fiqh, so that a ruling (considered to have applicability only to the specific situation for which it was revealed), is effective not because it was revealed last, but because it is most suited to the situation at hand.
Philip Schaff argues that the concept of abrogation was developed to "remove" contradictions found in the Quran which (according to him) abound "in repetitions and contradictions, which are not removed by the convenient theory of abrogation."
Another complaint is that naskh requires time-bound revelation, which is at odds with a revealer of truth who is an all-knowing, all-wise, eternal, self-existent creator and sustainer of the universe.
Aside from the argument that aspects of the Quran's message and the Prophet's teachings had to change as circumstances changed, some Islamic scholars defend naskh from the "God-changed-his-mind problem" maintaining that "whoever rejects abrogation has rejected His sovereignty and might" ('Abd ar-Rahmaan as-Sa'di), and that "abrogation as a mechanism that perfectly reflects God's omnipotence. God can change any ruling with another at any point in time He sees fit" (Louay Fatoohi). Cyril Glasse states that "generally" in naskh, a universal meaning was "modified" by a "more specific" meaning, necessary since the 'style' of Divine revelation is "direct and absolute", without "clauses, exceptions and qualification".
In answer to complaints by Christians and Jews that the Quran abrogates (at least) much of the Torah and New Testament, Ghulam Ahmed Parwez states that this is simply God's doing, something that humans should not question,
"The Ahl-ul-Kitab (People of the Book) also question the need for a new revelation (Qur'an) when previous revelations from Allah exist. They further ask why the Qur'an contains injunctions contrary to the earlier Revelation (the Torah) if it is from Allah? (...) Say to them that no one can question why Allah has adopted such a system of revelation. Do they not know that Allah, Who is sovereign over the universe, alone knows which law is to be revealed and at what time? (Say to them that) if despite knowing this fact, they still refuse to obey this code of laws, they will find that no other code can resolve the problems of life. In this context, O Jamat-ul-Momineen (the convinced Muslims)!
The emergence of naskh (initially as practice and then as fully elaborated theory) dates back to the first centuries of Islamic civilization. Almost all classical naskh works, for instance, begin by recounting the incident of the Kufan preacher banned from expounding the Quran by an early 'ilmic authority figure (usually 'Al? but sometimes also Ibn 'Abb?s) on account of his ignorance of the principles of naskh.  Whatever the historicity of such traditions:
...the elaboration of the theories is datable with certainty to at least the latter half of the second century after Muhammad, when Sh?fi'?, in his Ris?la and in the somewhat later Ikhtil?f al-Had?th was applying his considerable talents to resolving the serious problem of the apparent discrepancies between certain Qur'?nic verses and others; between certain had?ths and others; and, most serious of all, between certain Qur'?nic verses and certain had?ths.
Naskh as a technical term meaning 'abrogation' (although the precise sense of that must be left open) makes its appearance early on in exegesis, for example, in Muq?til's [d. 767] Khams mi'a ?ya (and, of course, his tafs?r).
Like other technical terms within Islamic exegesis (e.g. asb?b al-nuz?l), naskh attained its formal meaning through a process of theoretical refinement in which early applications of the concept were abandoned upon further logical or religious consideration. Tabar?'s ambivalent use of the term for the eradication of Satanic material has already been noted. Among naskh 's other, ultimately discarded, uses in early works of tafs?r are: the abrogation of a ruling from pre-Islamic (i.e. j?hil?) Arabia, and the juridical deflation of a broadly applicable ruling by a succeeding one which narrows its scope (nasakha min [al-?ya]- "an exception is provided to [the verse]"). The latter usage was reformulated by Sh?fi'? as takhs?s (specification/exception), resulting in a marked decrease in the amount of material considered mans?kh.
Putting aside dubiously attributed works, such as the Naskh al-Qur-?n of "al-Zuhr?", the principle of abrogation (without its naskh terminology) makes one of its earliest documented appearance in the Muwatta' of M?lik:
In his review of the question of whether the Muslim traveler should observe or may postpone the obligation to fast during the month of Ramad?n, which involves him in a comparison of conflicting opinion reported from many prominent Muslims of the past, including contradictory reports as to the practice of the Prophet himself, M?lik states that his teacher Zuhr? had told him that the Muslims had adopted as standard the latest of all the Prophet's reported actions... while in another chapter M?lik himself actually states that of the two relevant Kur'?n rulings, one had replaced the other. Elsewhere, M?lik rejects the notion that a ruling remains valid despite the reported withdrawal of the wording of the supposed Kur'?n 'verse' said to have originally imposed the ruling in question."
The impetus for this principle, seen already in M?lik's day, was the need to harmonize the regional variants of Islamic law both with one another as well as the putative sources of Islamic law. That the starting point for these local fiqhs was in fact neither the Qur'?n nor the Sunnah (in its later sense of the Sunnah of Muhammad) has been shown by Schacht. As authority for local views began to be attributed back in time to the Companions and eventually Muhammad himself (documented by what Schacht terms the "backward growth" of isn?ds) the contradictions in regional fiqh became irreconcilable.Naskh allowed for the alleviation of these tensions by the claim that, in the case of two "soundly" documented traditions contradicting one another, one had come later and abrogated the other.
Yet even after the need to ground their legal theories in either Sunnah or Qur'?n became apparent to the jurists, the regional fiqhs were not discarded, but became the third source in reformualting Islamic law, on par with and of even greater importance than Sunnah or Qur'?n! This can be seen in the postulation of "lost" verses whose rulings were still operative and conventiently corroborative of the jurist's own school of fiqh (e.g. the "stoning" and "suckling" verses). It is also evinced in Sh?fi'?'s remarkable admission that but for the guidance of the Sunnah the Muslims would have had no choice but to carry out the rulings of the Qur'?n!
This article contains too many or too-lengthy quotations for an encyclopedic entry. (January 2016)
Probably the most immediate concern was explaining the very existence of progressive revelation. What could account for God's turn to this expedient outside of limits to His omniscience (subsequent rulings are "better" because they are informed by superior knowledge) or inconstancy in the divine will? Both prospects were repugnant to orthodox theologians (at least of the Sunni variety; compare this to the Shi'ite doctrine of bada', however) and so other rationales were put forth. One of these relied upon the tried apologetic technique of reconstruing apparent limitations in the Creator as expressions of solicitude towards His creatures, introducing less onerous requirements:
The ruling may be better for you in this life, on account of its being easier to perform, where a previous obligation has been withdrawn, relieving you of the more difficult performance. For example, it has once been obligatory for the Muslims to engage in lengthy nocturnal prayers (Q.73:1). They were relieved of that burden (Q.73:20). That is an instance in which the n?sikh [abrogating (verse)] was better for them in this life.
Yet tahkf?f is equally applicable where the n?sikh introduces a more onerous requirement- for example, the extension of the ritual fast from a few days (Q.2:184) to the entire month of Ramadan (Q.2:185)- as its performance is "better" for men on account of it helping them attain greater reward in the Hereafter, or even when the change is indifferent, such as the switching of the qibla, as the reward will not change. Clearly, then, the criteria of tahkf?f is unfalsifiable, completely useless for distinguishing n?sikh from mans?kh, and therefore entirely dogmatic in character.
Another, much more specifically Islamic, problem was raised by the doctrine by mu'jaz- or the literary perfection and inimitability of the Qur'?n. How could one ?ya be replaced by one which is better than it, as Q.2:106 explicitly promises, if all ?yat or inimitable and therefore incommensurable? This issue was sidestepped by interpolation; the superior replacement is the verse's ruling, not the verse's wording, and so no violation of the doctrine of mu'jaz is entailed.
Lastly, there is the issue of abrogated material whose wording is preserved in the mushaf (naskh al-hukm d?na al-til?wa). Since the verse's ruling is inoperative, what purpose is served by retaining its wording? One common rationale, expressed here by Suy?ti (Itq?n) and mirroring the tahkf?f argument was:
...the Qur'?n was revealed so that its rulings might be known and their implementation rewarded; but... the Qur'?n is also recited with reverence, since it is the word of God, for whose recitation the pious Muslim is likewise rewarded. Further, to leave the wording, following the abrogation of the ruling was to provide for men a constant reminder of the compassion and mercy shown by their gracious Lord [ar-Rahman] Who had lightened the burden of some his previous requirements.
Overall, though, the Muslim commentators demonstrate a remarkable degree of complacency in the face of naskh 's more theologically disturbing implications, supremely confident (as expressed in the following gloss on a famous ?'isha hadith) that whatever the mechanisms used to expurgate or cancel the Divine revelation, what has ultimately come down to us is exactly what Allah intended mankind to have:
We were too occupied with the preparations in the Prophet's sick-room to give any thought to the safe-keeping of the sheets on which the revelations had been written out, and while we were tending our patient, a household animal got in from the yard and gobbled up some of the sheets which were kept below the bedding. Those who would account for all events here below in terms of divine agency could see in this most unfortunate mishap nothing incongruous with the divine promise, having revealed the Reminder, to preserve it. Here, indeed, was the working of the divine purpose... their removal, as an aspect of the divine revelatory procedures had been determined by God and had occurred under effective divine control. Having determined that these 'verses' would not appear in the final draft of His Book, God had arranged for their removal. The revelation was never, at any time, at the mercy of accidental forces.
Such complacency reflects the important constitutive effects of naskh's eventual theological sanitization. Once the genuineness of God's abrogation of His own commandments was accepted, the fact that no intelligible pattern underlay His sequence of actions was taken as indicative of important facts about the nature of the Creator, as well as the proper duties of His creatures. In particular this reinforced the extreme deontological currents within Islamic philosophy and ethics:
The Supreme Being imposes or forbids what He chooses. Nothing is either good or evil per se; God does not command 'the good' and prohibit 'the evil'. What God commands is good and what He forbids is evil. God is under no compulsion to any external moral imperative. Adherence to what He commands will be rewarded; performance of what he forbids will be punished. Both command and prohibition being tests of human obedience, God may naskh what He chooses. 
The Creator and Sovereign Lord of the Universe shares His absolute power with none. To test man's obedience, God may order them to do whatever he chooses, or to desist from whatever He wills. He may command what was never previously required or forbid what was previously unregulated; equally. He may prohibit what He Himself had actually commanded, or command what He Himself had previously prohibited... Nor may men question anything that God requires of them. They must only identify what God has commanded or forbidden and act immediately to demonstrate their creaturely status and humble obedience. 
The Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali schools of Sunni Islam have maintained that only Quranic verses revealed later can abrogate an earlier Quranic verse, but a Sunnah from a Hadith can never abrogate a Quranic verse. In contrast, the Hanafi fiqh of Sunni Islam, from the days of Abu Hanifa, along with his disciples such as Abu Yusuf, maintained that Sunnah can abrogate a Quranic verse. The Hanafi jurists used Quranic verse 10:15 to justify their opinion, stating that abrogation of the Qur'an by the life actions of Muhammad (Sunnah) was based solely on his Divine inspiration, that when he acted or said anything, any abrogation implicit through his action, of the earlier Qur'anic ruling was from Allah alone, according to Yusuf Suicmez. Hanafi school stated, adds Suicmez, that to accept that "a Sunnah can abrogate the Qur'an entails honoring of Muhammad".
While traditional doctrine of naskh has been used to abrogate earlier ayat in favor of later ones, which form the basis of Islamic law, this was reversed by Sudanese scholar Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, who advanced the idea that the Meccan surah, while revealed earlier (and which give more prominence to the position of women and also praise other prophets and their communities--i.e. Jews and Christians), contain "the basic and pure doctrine of Islam", and should form the "basis of the legislation" for modern society. These ayat abrogate some of the later (and less tolerant) but specialized Medinan surah which were revealed while Muhammad was governing that city and contain "compromises" for its political climate. While the Medinan surah were appropriate for their time, their doctrine is not eternal and not necessarily appropriate for the 20th or 21st century.
Abrogation is applicable to both sources of Sharia: the Quran and the Hadiths. A Qur'?nic verse may abrogate another Qur'?nic verse, and a Sunnah in Hadiths may likewise abrogate another Sunnah. The possibility of abrogation between these two sources, though, was a more contentious issue precipitated by the absence within a source of the appropriate abrogating (n?sikh) or abrogated (mans?kh) material necessary to bring concordance between it and the Fiqh. The scope of Naskh doctrine between sources has been one of the major differences between the Shafi'i and Hanafi fiqhs, with Shafi'i sect of jurisprudence forbidding abrogation by the Sunnah of the Qur'?n, while Hanafi sect allowing abrogation by the Sunnah of the Qur'?n.
Arguing determinedly that any verbal discrepancies between the Qur'?n and the reported sayings or reports of the practices of Muhammed -- the Sunnah of the Prophet -- were merely illusory and could always be removed on the basis of a satisfactory understanding of the mechanism of revelation and the function of the prophet-figure, Sh?fi'? set his face decidedly against any acceptance of the idea then current that in all such cases the Qur'?n had abrogated the Sunnah, or the Sunnah the Qur'?n.
This stance was a reaction to larger developments within Islamic jurisprudence, particularly the reformulation of the Fiqh away from early foreign or regional influences and toward more eminently Islamic bases such as the Qur'?n. This assertion of Qur'?nic primacy was accompanied by calls for an abandonment of the Sunnah. Sh?fi'?'s insistence upon the impossibility of contradiction between Sunnah and Qur'?n can thus be seen as one component in this larger effort of rescuing the Sunnah:
Asked point-blank whether the Sunnah could ever be abrogated by the Qur'?n, Sh?fi'? had bluntly replied [in the Ris?la] that that could never happen. How could the practice of the Prophet be different from the commands revealed to him by God and recited to his followers? Were the Sunnah to be abrogated by the Qur'?n, the Prophet would immediately introduce a second sunnah to indicate that his first sunnah had been abrogated by his second sunnah- in order to demonstrate that a thing can be abrogated only by its like (mithlihi) [ cf. Q.2:106].
Later scholars, writing when the juridical legitimacy of the Sunnah could be taken for granted (thanks largely to Sh?fi'?'s efforts!), were less inclined to adopt his inflexible stance. To their minds the reality of this sort of inter-source abrogation was proven by several "indisputable" instances: the changing of the qibla towards Mecca and away from Jerusalem, and the introduction of the penalty of stoning for adultery. The following passage from Qurtub? (al-J?mi' li ahk?m al-Qur'?n) is representative in this regard:
...the Qur'?n may be naskh-ed by the Qur'?n and the Sunnah by the Sunnah. The Qur'?n may, in addition, be naskh-ed by the Sunnah, as has occurred in the case of Q.2:180, which was replaced by the Sunnah ruling: no wasiya [i.e. extra bequest] in favor of an heir. M?lik admitted this principle, but Sh?fi'? denied it, although the fuqah? all admit, in the instance of the penalty for adultery, that the flogging element of Q.24:2 has been allowed to lapse in the case of those offenders who are condemned to death by stoning. There is no explanation for the abandonment of the flogging element other than that the penalty all now acknowledge is based on the Sunnah, i.e. the practice of the Prophet.
In the instance of the change of qibla, a Sunnah ruling was set aside in favor of a Qur'?n ruling -- there is no reference in the Qur'?n to the Jerusalem direction of prayer.
In addition to being discussed within general works of jurisprudence, naskh generated its own corpus of specialized legal manuals. These treatises invariably begin with an introduction designed to impress the importance and high Islamic credibility of the science, often by an appeal to 'ilmic authority figures of the past (as in the story of 'Al? and the Kufan preacher). As is made clear in these stories, "none may occupy judicial or religious office in the community who is not equipped with this indispensable knowledge and who is incapable of distinguishing n?sikh [abrogator] from mans?kh [abrogatee].
The remainder of the introduction then typically treats the various modes of naskh, naskh 's applicability between Sunnah and Qur'?n, and- in appeasement of theological scruples- why naskh is not the same as bad?', or inconstancy of the Divine Will. Following this comes the core of the treatise, an enumeration of abrogated verses in s?ra order of the Qur'?n. In their consideration of n?sikh wal-mans?kh the taxonomic predilections of these authors comes out, evinced in their discussions of special verses considered "marvels" ('aj?'ib) of the Qur'?n, such as the verse which abrogates the greatest number of other verses (Q.9:5), the verse which was in effect longest until it was abrogated (Q.46:9), and the verse which contains both an abrogatee and its abrogator (Q.5:105).
The following is a list of classical examples of the genre:
Modern examples include:
Such peaceful methods of preaching and persuasion were not adopted, as some would have us believe, only when political circumstances made force and violence impossible or impolitic, but were most strictly enjoined in numerous passages of the Qur'an, as follows : [...] --Such precepts are not confined to the Meccan Surahs, but are found in abundance also in those delivered at Medina...